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The paper evaluates the working of German CFC rules that restrict the use of foreign 
subsidiaries located in low-tax countries to shelter passive investment income from home 
taxation. While passive investments make up a significant fraction of German outbound FDI, 
we find that German CFC rules are quite effective in restricting investments in low-tax 
jurisdictions. We find evidence that the German 2001 tax reform, which unilaterally 
introduced exemption of passive income in medium- and high-tax countries, has led to some 
shifting of passive assets into countries for which the exemption was previously limited. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of foreign source income of domestic corporations is one of the main issues in 
shaping a country's international tax rules. The treatment of dividends received from a foreign 
subsidiary usually follows one of two approaches. Exemption countries, such as the 
Netherlands, France, and Belgium, abstain from taxation of those dividends. This reflects a 
territorial approach to international taxation. Countries like the U.S. or Japan, in contrast, 
adhere to the residence approach that subjects worldwide repatriated income to domestic 
taxation. At the same time, these countries provide a credit for foreign dividends. In such a 
credit system, the foreign dividend is subject to corporate tax when received by the parent, but 
a tax credit that takes into account taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary on profits that underlie 
the distributed dividend may be credited. This is called an indirect tax credit, while a tax 
credit that is granted for foreign withholding taxes on the dividend is called a direct tax credit. 
Usually, capital-exporting countries that use a credit system provide for both the indirect and 
the direct credit in cases of a qualifying participation.  
  One of the problems that may haunt both exemption and credit countries is that 
domestic firms use low-tax jurisdictions to shelter their income from higher home-country 
taxation. In the case where the home country runs an exemption system this is self-evident: 
foreign income earned by a foreign subsidiary and subject to low taxation abroad is exempt 
from high domestic taxes. In the case of credit countries, there still may be an advantage to 
low foreign tax rates, as the home tax may be deferred until repatriation of the foreign profit. 
These tax shelters are generally accepted by home countries of parent corporations in the case 
of active foreign profits that derive from production, trade, and services. Here a possible 
argument for doing so is capital import neutrality: foreign subsidiaries of high-tax parents 
should be given the possibility to compete with native low-tax firms on an equal basis   2
(Musgrave 1969). Conversely, subjecting profits of foreign subsidiaries to immediate home-
country taxation may put them at a disadvantage.  
While acceptable in the case of active business income abroad, the tax shelter implied 
by exemption or, to a lesser extent, deferral of home-country taxes is much less palatable for 
capital-exporting countries if the foreign subsidiary is not competing abroad, but merely acts 
as an instrument to manage the company group's liquid assets. Most industrialized countries 
have therefore legislated measures that limit the tax privilege of exemption or deferral in the 
case of passive investments. The standard approach used in the legislation on controlled 
foreign companies (CFC rules) by countries such as the U.S., Germany, France, the UK, or 
Italy is to tax passive investment income of foreign subsidiaries on an accrual basis if some 
conditions are met; the privilege of exemption or deferral is not extended to these incomes.  
While CFC rules are of considerable importance in the legal and theoretical 
discussions of international corporate tax systems (see, e.g., Weichenrieder 1996 for a 
theoretical study, and Lang et al. 2004 for a legal comparison of international CFC rules), we 
are not aware of studies that empirically discuss the effectiveness of CFC rules.
1 One of the 
main purposes of this paper is to fill this gap by looking at the German experience.  
A first empirical question that arises is about the magnitude and country distribution of 
passive assets held by German-owned foreign subsidiaries. To what extent do we see a 
concentration of passive assets in jurisdictions with low corporate taxes? We use several 
approaches in this paper to shed light on the effectiveness of CFC rules. One approach is to 
consider whether the way changes in tax rates affect passive investment depends on whether 
CFC legislation is applicable or not. Our estimates suggest that there indeed is a significant 
difference. The applicability of the German CFC rules seems to reduce the attractiveness of 
low local tax rates for passive investment of existing subsidiaries and reduces the incentives to 
locate subsidiaries in these jurisdictions. Over the last decades there were several changes in 
                                                 
1 A notable exception applies in the case of the analysis of hybrid structures and the U.S. "check the box" rules. 
See Mutti and Grubert (2006) for details.    3
the German CFC legislation. One of the changes that we exploit for our purposes is the 2003 
reform that ended a tax preference that the CFC rules had given to intracompany lending as 
compared to arm’s-length investment. We find that the reform had some impact on 
intracompany loans provided by low-tax subsidiaries, which is in line with expectations. We 
also make use of the German 2001 reform that extended the exemption method to a wider set 
of countries.  
Overall, the evidence provided in this paper is that German CFC rules have a 
significant and predictable impact on multinational financing and seem to be an effective 
measure to limit the shifting of passive assets. We hope that our empirical results have some 
value for evaluating tax policy options. If CFC rules were rather ineffective, then deferral 
countries might have a comparative advantage over exemption countries in curbing passive 
investment abroad. In the case of ineffective CFC rules, an exemption country forgoes 
taxation of passive income altogether, while in the case of a deferral system home-country 
taxes are only postponed. Conversely, in the case of effective CFC rules, moving from a 
deferral system to an exemption of foreign dividend – as currently discussed in the U.S. and 
the UK – may come at a relatively small cost in terms of additional passive investment abroad.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II illustrates the German 
CFC rules in more detail. Section III describes the data, before Section IV presents the main 
empirical evidence. Section V concludes.  
II.  German CFC Rules 
While resident individuals are taxed on their worldwide income irrespective of whether 
a dividend has been paid by a German or a foreign corporation, foreign dividends that are 
received by a German corporation are exempt. In addition, the German corporation is not 
taxable on retained earnings abroad. Until 2000, the exemption of foreign dividends was 
restricted to dividends paid from treaty countries. Since 2001, 95% of the dividends received 
have been exempt, whether a tax treaty applies or not. Since 1972, however, limits to   4
exemption have applied due to §§ 7–14 of the German Außensteuergesetz (German Foreign 
Tax Act).
2 These CFC rules closely follow the U.S. subpart F legislation introduced in 1964, 
and address resident shareholders of controlled foreign corporations investing in low-taxed 
passive business operations. Under certain conditions, the German rules provide that the pro 
rata share of low-taxed passive income of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) abroad is 
included in the shareholder’s income on a current basis, implying that deferral and exemption 
privileges are denied. German CFC rules are applicable if three requirements are met:  
 
Ownership requirement. In general, the ownership requirement is met if more than 50 percent 
of ordinary shares or voting rights in the foreign corporation are held directly or indirectly by 
German resident individuals or companies.
3  
 
Passive Income. Shareholders of a CFC may be subject to tax on the passive income of the 
CFC, where the term passive income is defined negatively. Passive income is any income that 
does not qualify as active under § 8 (1) Außensteuergesetz. Active income is income from 
agriculture, production, banking and insurance, trade, dividends, and the disposal of shares. 
Under some additional requirements, also income from services and from renting and leasing 
is deemed to be active. Income from borrowing and lending of capital is active if the German 
resident shareholder proves that all of the capital is raised in foreign capital markets from 
unrelated persons and the same capital is lent to an active foreign business or permanent 
establishment or to a German business or permanent establishment. As a consequence, interest 
income from financial activities is generally passive income if capital is raised within the 
group. Passive capital investment income is a special subcategory of passive income and 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description see Förster and Schmidtmann (2004).  
3 Under certain conditions, also ownership of former residents is considered.    5
includes income from the possession, administration, and management of cash, receivables, 
securities, shareholdings, or similar assets. However, such income qualifies as active in the 
case of foreign subsidiaries in banking and insurance.  
 
Low taxation. German CFC rules only apply to low-taxed passive income.  Passive income is 
considered low-taxed if the tax rate on such income is less than 25 percent (less than 30 
percent before 2001).  
 
If the three legal requirements discussed above are all met, the low-taxed passive 
income is included in the taxable income of the German resident shareholders, but foreign 
income taxes on the passive income may be deducted or, upon election of the shareholder, 
credited against the German income or corporation tax.
4 The German rules also apply to 
ownership chains, to prevent multitier structures from being used as avoidance measures.  
 
Some German double-tax treaties exempt foreign income regardless of whether this 
income stems from passive or active investment. In other words, the exemption privilege is 
not bound to an activity clause, which makes application of German CFC rules difficult. 
Therefore, in a 1992 revision of the CFC rules, Germany unilaterally declared such treaty 
protections as not applicable for passive investment income. An exception was introduced for 
passive capital investment income from intragroup financing activities, where treaty 
protection still applied for 40 percent of the income. In 2003 treaty protection for ordinary 
passive income was abolished completely. 
                                                 
4 Passive income up to €80,000 (€62,000 before 2007) may be innocuous if it does not represent more than 10 
percent of the CFC's pretax income.    6
III.  Data Set 
The paper uses the MiDi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank to investigate the 
impact of German CFC rules. German investors owning foreign subsidiaries are legally 
required to report on any foreign operation if it meets mild size and ownership requirements. 
For wholly owned foreign subsidiaries compulsory reporting applies if total assets exceed the 
equivalent of €3m. In addition, German investors are obliged to report also on subsidiaries 
that are held via intermediate companies if ownership ties are sufficiently strong (see Lipponer 
2003). Most importantly for our purpose, investors have to report on their foreign subsidiaries' 
lending to other affiliated firms, on their equity ownership of affiliated companies, and on 
their financial assets in total.
5 We complemented the data with information on national 
characteristics from the World Bank Development Indicators and with tax rate information 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Bureau of Tax Policy Research at the University of 
Michigan, KPMG, and other sources.  
IV.  Empirical Evidence 
IV.1.  CFC Rules and the Location of Passive Assets 
In a first step we analyze the allocation of liquid assets in German multinational 
corporations. More precisely, we highlight the allocation of financial assets abroad that count 
neither as equity holdings in affiliated companies nor as loans to subsidiaries. The deduction 
of loans and equity stakes in affiliated corporations avoids double counting of passive 
investments in the case of ownership chains. The subgroup of passive assets considered will 
mainly consist of bonds and portfolio equity in arm’s-length situations with a moderate or 
negligible difference between book and market values. These passive assets may be shifted 
from high-tax to low-tax locations without triggering capital gains taxation. Therefore, 
                                                 
5 This information is missing in most other company balance sheets as available in the Amadeus or Datastream 
data sets. Previous studies that use MiDi for analyzing tax effects on FDI include Ramb and Weichenrieder 
(2005) and Büttner and Ruf (2007).   7
abstracting from CFC legislation, a simple comparison of statutory tax rates suggests that 
multinationals should hold these transferable passive assets through subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries and that the benefit of doing so should increase as the tax rate in the low-tax country 
decreases.  
However, adding CFC rules may change the picture. The German rules provide that 
the passive income earned by controlled foreign corporations abroad is deemed as income of 
the German parent if the effective taxation of the passive income abroad falls short of a 
threshold value, which has been 25% since 2001 (30% before 2001). While taxes on the 
passive income paid abroad may be credited against German taxation, the application of the 
German tax rate (including the relevant local rate) makes this the effective tax rate on the 
passive investment.  
In a first step we look at the country distribution of passive investments, which is 
illustrated in Table 1. If the CFC regulation is binding and multinationals cannot work around 
it, we should expect few passive investments in low-tax countries, as the effective rate would 
not be the host-country rate but the higher German tax rate. Indeed, the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1, which reports on the passive assets in 23 countries that in 2006 hosted significant 
shares of passive assets of German multinationals, is largely in line with this. While low-tax 
jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, and the Netherland Antilles are on the list, the 
majority of passive assets are found in major economies with medium or high headline 
corporate tax rates, like the U.S., France, Canada, the UK, or the Netherlands.
6    
The picture slightly changes if we compare passive investment with the amount of 
fixed investment and intangibles of German-owned firms in the respective countries. In this 
                                                 
6 A qualification with respect to the effective tax rate may apply because of special holding company regimes in 
some countries, like the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, subject to certain conditions, since 1997 a group finance 
company could establish a reserve up to 80 percent of its financial services income. A tax-free withdrawal from 
the reserve could be made equal to 50 percent of investments in affiliates or up to 100 percent for certain indirect 
investments. According to a letter of the Dutch government to the European Commission, a total of 87 
companies from all over the world have been admitted to this scheme (EU Commission 
Decision (2003/515/EG)), including Dutch-owned companies. So only a small number will be German-owned. 
The group-financing-facility reserve deduction has come under attack by the European Commission and will be 
terminated by 2010.   8
case small economies like the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Cyprus, or the Netherland Antilles rank 
first. For these economies, passive asset holdings of German companies dwarf corresponding 
real investment by German affiliates.  
 
Table 1: Passive assets outside banking and insurance per country (2006, in million euros) 











Statutory tax rate 
including  local 
taxes (CT) 
USA 5345.4 125343.3 19.0% 40.0% 
Netherlands 4904.3 7609.1 17.4% 29.6% 
United Kingdom 2110.8  36621.0 7.5% 30.0% 
Cayman Islands 1616.3  66.8 5.7% 0.0% 
Luxembourg 1585.6 4321.5 5.6% 29.6% 
France 1155.4 16133.0 4.1% 33.3% 
Austria 1104.1 10577.4 3.9% 25.0% 
Italy 1030.1 12742.8 3.7% 37.3% 
Australia 973.8 2801.3 3.5% 30.0% 
South Africa 659.7  1277.8 2.3% 36.9% 
Japan 658.0 2175.8 2.3% 40.7% 
Spain 600.6 10633.7 2.1% 35.0% 
Switzerland 507.1 7070.8 1.8% 29.0% 
Hong Kong 494.2  384.9 1.8% 17.5% 
Jersey 465.2 3.5 1.7% 20.0% 
Canada 403.6 9188.2 1.4% 36.1% 
Denmark 395.5 2131.5 1.4% 28.0% 
Netherland Antilles 382.2  0.1 1.4% 34.5% 
Turkey 344.7 2094.2 1.2% 30.0% 
Sweden 268.0 4592.0 1.0% 28.0% 
Cyprus 266.3 107.3 0.9% 10.0% 
South Korea 251.3  1772.9 0.9% 27.5% 
Russia 245.8 4027.5 0.9% 24.0% 
Annotations: In column (1), the table reports the passive investment, defined as the total financial assets net of 
equity in affiliated firms and lending to affiliated firms, in the country under consideration. We left out firms 
with an ownership share of the German investor of less than 90%, and excluded unincorporated subsidiaries and 
subsidiaries in banking and insurance, as these industries are treated differently under the German CFC rules. 
Column (2) reports the aggregated fixed investment and intangibles of nonfinancial companies. As in the 
following regressions of Table 2, we censored firms at the 99.9 centile of passive assets.  
 
To investigate whether the German CFC rules restrict German multinationals in their 
allocation of passive investment, Table 2 reports regression results on the micro level using 
the panel data described above. As in the descriptive statistics of Table 1, we left out firms 
with an ownership share of the German investor of less than 90%, and excluded   9
unincorporated subsidiaries and subsidiaries in banking and insurance, as these industries are 
treated differently under the German CFC rules. Generally, the observed units are the 
German-owned subsidiaries abroad. However, in cases in which a German parent owns more 
than one subsidiary in a specific country, we aggregated passive investment across 
observations, i.e., affiliated firms in one country and year were merged and treated as a single 
observation. This takes into account that affiliated firms located in the same country and 
owned by the same parent may fail to be independent observations.  
While the left-hand variable in the empirical models (1)–(3) of Table 2 is the natural 
logarithm of passive assets, in models (4)–(6) we use the absolute value of passive assets. 
Passive investment here is defined as the total financial assets net of equity in affiliated firms 
and lending to affiliated firms, in the country under consideration. The following right-hand 
variables appear in Table 2. CT captures the statutory corporate tax rate in the host country. 
The variable CFC_DUMMY takes on the value one if the country has a statutory tax rate that 
is below the safe-haven tax rate of the German CFC rules (30% before 2001, 25% thereafter) 
and the rules are therefore potentially binding. Clearly, effective CFC rules suggest a negative 
coefficient for this variable. CT*CFC_Dummy is built by interacting the tax rate and 
CFC_DUMMY. Similarly, we created CT*(1 – CFC_Dummy). These interaction terms are 
motivated by the hypothesis that when CFC rules are binding, then we expect that a lower 
corporate tax rate should have a smaller impact on the attraction of passive assets than when 
the CFC_Dummy is zero. A different way to model the impact of the regulation is by using 
CT_EFF. This is a tax rate that is constructed under the assumption that the German CFC 
rules are always binding if the local statutory tax rate falls short of the safe-haven rate. That is, 
CT_EFF equals CT if CT is larger than or equal to the safe-haven rate, but equals the 
applicable German tax rate otherwise. LN(ASSETS) measures a subsidiary's nonfinancial 
assets (fixed and intangible assets plus working capital).
7 It is a proxy for firm size, reflecting 
that larger firms with more real capital may wish to hold larger amounts of liquid assets.  
                                                 
7 A limitation of the German FDI data is that it is not possible to separate tangible and intangible assets.    10
 
Table 2: CFC rules and passive assets 
 OLS  Panel  Poisson 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
COEFFICIENT          
CFC_DUMMY    -0.771***  -1.475***   -0.819**  -2.589***  
  (0.17)  (0.47)   (0.33) (0.94)  
CT    -3.691***     -3.584***    
  (1.10)     (1.28)    
CT*CFC_DUMMY   -1.277      3.038  
    (1.62)     (3.40)  
CT*(1 – CFC_DUMMY)    -4.294***     -5.362***  
    (1.25)     (1.86)  
CT_EFF     -2.834***    -2.774** 
     (0.65)    (1.34) 
LN(ASSETS)  0.397***  0.397*** 0.396***  0.307*** 0.308*** 0.309*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.032) (0.038) (0.039) 
LN(CORR)  0.488**  0.435* 0.577**  0.170  0.0330 0.218 
  (0.24)  (0.23) (0.24)  (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) 
LN(GDPPC)  0.578***  0.519*** 0.562***  1.499*** 1.591*** 1.455*** 
  (0.14)  (0.15) (0.15)  (0.24) (0.27) (0.21) 
LN(GDP)  0.0929*  0.0988* 0.0720*  0.186** 0.209** 0.173* 
  (0.052)  (0.053) (0.042)  (0.085) (0.10)  (0.093) 
LN(INTEREST) -0.0482  -0.0604  -0.0187  0.113  0.0756  0.100 
  (0.091)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) 
Observations 30815 30815 30815 85388  85388  85388
R-squared  0.54  0.54  0.54  -- -- -- 
Annotations: The dependent variable in (1)–(3) is the log of passive assets, in (4)–(6) the amount of passive 
assets. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering within country-year cells for columns (1)–(3) 
and derived from bootstrapping for (4)–(6). Stars denote p-values; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. All 
estimations include parent fixed effects, and firms are observed during the period 1996–2006 (unbalanced 
sample). Affiliates in banking and insurance are not included in the sample, since their activities are assumed to 
be active according to the German CFC rules. In cases in which a German parent owns more than one subsidiary 
in a specific country, we aggregated passive investment across country-year observations. The data has been 
censored at the 0.1 percent of the observations with the largest amounts of passive assets. 
 
Finally, we use four variables capturing nontax country characteristics. LN(GDP) 
measures the log of GDP measured in purchasing power parities. Since tax rates and country 
sizes have been found to be systematically correlated,
8 inclusion of this size measure prevents 
the tax rate from picking up size effects. In addition we use the log of per capita GDP, 
LN(GDPPC), measured in purchasing power parities. LN(INTEREST) reflects the local bank 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Weichenrieder (2005).   11
lending rate, and LN(CORR) is defined as the logarithm of the Transparency International 
corruption index, which is constructed with higher values of the index indicating lower 
corruption. All regressions include a full set of parent fixed effects and year fixed effects, the 
coefficients of which are not reported.  
Column (1) reports results of an OLS regression with CT and CFC_DUMMY as the 
main variables of interest. As expected, the coefficient for the tax rate is negative, implying 
that, in general, a higher tax rate is detrimental to the allocation of passive assets. At the same 
time, CFC_DUMMY is significantly negative, and the coefficient −0.771 implies that the 
holdings of passive assets are reduced by some 77% on the subsidiary level if a country is 
affected by the German CFC rules.
9 
Before we discuss the results for the other covariates, we would like to comment on 
the tax variables in the other specifications of Table 2. Regression (2) makes use of the 
interacted variables CT*CFC_Dummy and CT*(1 – CFC_Dummy) and drops CT. While both 
interacted variables are negative, the larger coefficient of CT when the CFC rules are not 
binding and the insignificant coefficient for low-tax countries confirm the view that the CFC 
rules are influencing the allocation of passive assets. A peculiarity of the results of model (2) 
is that the coefficient of CFC_DUMMY is smaller than minus one, suggesting that the CFC 
rules reduce passive assets by more than one hundred percent, an obvious impossibility. A 
likely reason for this result is that CT is a bad proxy for the effective tax on the return on 
passive assets. While for CT larger than 25% (30% before 2001) CT equals the effective tax 
rate, for smaller CT the effective level jumps to the German level, which for many years was 
near 40%. It is this discretionary jump in the effective tax rate that should be picked up here 
and may explain the large absolute value of CFC_DUMMY.  
This problem is circumvented in regression (3), where CT_EFF as the only tax 
variable equals the German corporate tax rate for CT < 25% (30% before 2001), and CT else. 
                                                 
9 Since the CFC_DUMMY in principle could simply reflect a nonlinear effect of the tax rate, we also used an 
unreported specification in which the squared tax rate was used as an additional regressor, which turned out to be 
insignificant and irrelevant for the significance and value of the CFC_DUMMY coefficient; and the significance 
and value of CFC_DUMMY were also unaffected by using the log of the tax rate rather than the rate itself.    12
Using this effective tax rate made CFC_DUMMY insignificant, which seems to support the 
view that in model (2) it largely picked up the described discontinuity. CFC_Dummy was 
therefore dropped in (3), where CT_EFF rather than CT is included. The results in column (3) 
suggest that the effective tax rate – as a combination of local rate and German CFC rules – can 
be considered as a highly significant driver for the allocation of passive assets.  
There are two possible problems with the OLS results presented in columns (1)–(3). 
First, taking the logarithm of the stock of passive assets forces us to drop a large number of 
observations with zero passive assets. This may lead to a possible selection bias in the 
results.
10 Second, as emphasized by Silva and Tenreyo (2006), estimating a logarithmic or 
semilogarithmic OLS model may lead to biased estimations if the data is heteroskedastic. As a 
solution, these authors suggest using a Poisson maximum-likelihood model, and this route has 
been taken also in subsequent trade studies (e.g., Egger and Larch 2008), where zero bilateral 
trade between remote countries is a frequent phenomenon.  
The results for the Poisson models are presented in columns (4)–(6) of Table 2 and 
contain the same set of regressors as the OLS models. While the left-hand side is now 
measured in total passive assets rather than its logarithm, the tax coefficients of the Poisson 
maximum-likelihood model, as in the previous models, can be interpreted as semielasticities. 
While some of the absolute values of the tax coefficients are somewhat higher than in the OLS 
models, the message of the Poisson estimates is very similar, and the results of (4) and (6) are  
closely comparable to those in (1) and (3) despite the more than doubling of the observations. 
A difference that appears in column (5) when compared with the respective OLS result in 
column (2) is that the coefficient of CT*CFC_DUMMY is now positive, but this coefficient 
comes with a very high standard error.  
In all empirical models of Table 2, LN(ASSETS) was introduced to capture that a 
larger firm with larger real assets may find it worthwhile to have more liquid assets. The data 
                                                 
10 To address the selection problem we also experimented with a Heckman two-stage model, which produced 
results closely comparable to those presented in Table 2, but our concerns about the appropriateness of the 
variables used in the selection stage induced us to omit the results.    13
is compatible with this hypothesis, and the regression suggests that a one percent increase in 
real assets is associated with an increase in passive investment of some 0.4 percent when 
estimated by OLS and by 0.3 percent in the Poisson models. LN(GDP) was introduced on the 
basis that a large host country may invite making more passive investments. This is 
confirmed, but the coefficient is only weakly significant at the ten percent level. The interest 
level in the host country, LN(INTEREST), does not appear to be influential for the size of 
passive investments. LN(CORR) operates as expected: a lower level of corruption (a higher 
index) increases passive investments.
11 GDP per capita, which may also reflect the quality of 
the institutions, had also a consistent and positive effect on passive assets.  
While the Poisson estimates solve the problem of zero observations, the results 
presented in Table 2 still do not model the location decision of German multinationals (as 
attention is restricted to observed affiliates), but are conditional on the location decision 
having been taken. Some affiliates may not have been founded just because of low tax rates 
for passive assets, or because of the applicability of CFC rules. Therefore, as a complement to 
our results so far, we now look at the factors that influence the location of affiliates with 
sizable passive assets.
12 For this purpose we look at the decision problem from the point of 
view of the German multinationals. One shortcoming of our FDI data is that we have little 
information about the German parent firm apart from a firm identifier and the industry in 
which it is operating. We therefore do not attempt to look at the factors that induce German 
parents to set up affiliates with large passive assets, but look at the decision where to locate 
these, given that such an affiliate is on record. For a set of 77 countries and 1242 parent firms, 
we defined an endogenous binary variable that was encoded with the value one if the parent 
under consideration owned an affiliate with a substantial fraction of passive assets. Given that 
the German CFC rules may allow affiliates to have ten percent of their income from passive 
                                                 
11 Using the coefficients derived from model (3) implies that improving the corruption index from 4 to 6 (which 
is roughly equivalent to the difference between Bulgaria and Slovenia) allows one to increase the tax rate by 8 
percentage points without detrimental effects on passive assets.   
12 This two-step approach was suggested by Manning, Duan, and Rogers (1987) in the absence of exclusion 
restrictions.    14
investment if the total income from that source does not exceed a certain absolute limit, we 
used a ten percent rule for encoding. Therefore observations received the value one if passive 
assets exceeded ten percent of total assets. Other affiliates and nonexistent affiliates receive 
the value zero.  
The three conditional logit regression results reported in Table 3 [columns (1)–(3)] 
follow the setup of Table 2, and all tend to confirm the effectiveness of CFC rules for location 
decisions. The first column reports estimates where CFC_DUMMY and CT appear as tax 
variables. As in Table 2, they have the expected sign. Both the tax rate and the applicability of 
the German CFC rules significantly reduce the probability that a country receives a German 
affiliate with passive assets of more than ten percent of total assets. The specification in 
column (2) splits up the tax-rate effect according to whether the foreign tax rate triggers 
applicability of the CFC rules or not. Unlike in Table 2, in both cases a higher tax rate is 
significantly discouraging. In addition, however, CFC_DUMMY has still a negative effect on 
the location decision, although significance is only at the ten percent level. Finally, equation 
(3) uses the effective tax rate CT_EFF as a regressor.  
The three models include four country characteristics from previous regression. GDP, 
GDP per capita, and the corruption index perform in the expected positive way. Unlike in 
Table 2, the interest level now enters significantly negative in the location equation, possibly 
reflecting that lower local interest rates indicate a more stable currency.  
Columns (4)–(6) include regression with the same set of regressors, but using a simple 
linear regression OLS with parent fixed effects to determine the relative importance of the 
various factors. Given that the overall (unconditional) probability for one of the 77 countries 
of receiving a German affiliate with more than ten percent of passive assets is 2.14%, the 
coefficient of CFC_Dummy in column (4) indicates that applicability of the CFC rules 
reduces this probability by some 37%. Using the panel logit results of column (1) and 
evaluating at the sample mean probability for the location of a passive investment subsidiary 
yields an even higher effect of 55%, or 1.2 percentage points.    15
 
Table 3: The location of affiliates with passive assets 
  Panel logit model  Linear probability model 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
CFC_DUMMY   −0.805*** -0.453*    -0.00795*** 0.00297   
 (0.11)  (0.27)    (0.0015)  (0.0055)   
CT   -4.116***      -0.0261***     
 (0.54)      (0.0097)     
CT*CFC_DUMMY   -4.886***      -0.0444***   
   (0.68)      (0.011)   
CT*(1 – CFC_DUMMY)   -3.439***      -0.00340   
   (0.71)      (0.015)   
CT_EFF     -1.998***      -0.0183** 
     (0.47)      (0.0073) 
LN(GDPPC) 1.187***  1.158***  1.153***  0.0142***  0.0137***  0.0142*** 
 (0.093)  (0.098)  (0.094)  (0.00093) (0.00093)  (0.00093) 
LN(GDP) 0.422***  0.414***  0.382***  0.00907***  0.00888***  0.00916***
 (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.00058) (0.00057)  (0.00055) 
LN(INTEREST) -0.168**  -0.157**  -0.145** -0.00180*  -0.00169*  -0.00156 
 (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.0010) (0.0010)  (0.00099) 
LN(CORR) 0.395***  0.447***  0.460***  0.0113***  0.0119***  0.0116*** 
 (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0016) 
Observations 160409  160409  160409  163472  163472  163472 
Pseudo R-squared / R- 
squared 
0.13 0.13  0.13  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Annotations: Columns (1)–(3) report conditional logit estimates with parent fixed effects. Numbers in columns 
(1)–(3) represent coefficients rather than odds ratios. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the parent 
level. Columns (4)–(6) report OLS with standard errors clustered across country-year cells. Stars denote p-
values: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. All estimations include parent fixed effects, and firms are observed 
during the period 1996–2006 (unbalanced sample). Affiliates in banking and insurance are not considered in the 
sample, since their activities are assumed to be active according to the German CFC rules.  
 
 
IV.2.  Loans to Affiliated Enterprises and CFC Legislation  
In the last section we concentrated on the investment in arm's-length transactions. The 
present section complements the analysis by looking at intrafirm lending. Most countries 
allow firms to deduct the interest cost of corporate debt. The advantage of the debt tax shield 
is larger, the larger the local tax rate is. For this reason, multinational firms have an incentive 
to allocate debt in high-tax countries and to allocate equity in low-tax ones. A related strategy 
that may be motivated by international tax rate differentials is the establishment of financial 
conduit entities in low-tax countries or tax havens. A tax-efficient approach may be to finance   16
these companies by equity and have them forward these funds in the form of intracompany 
loans to high-tax subsidiaries, possibly including the parent firm (see, e.g., Mintz 2004, 
Weichenrieder and Mintz 2008). As a result, the multinational's interest expenses are tax-
deductible in high-tax countries, whereas the taxation of the interest payments in the conduit 
entity is subject to low or even zero tax rates. Abstracting from countries' antiavoidance 
measures, the shifting of equity and debt, unlike the shifting of real assets, does not trigger 
taxation of hidden reserves and should therefore be comparatively straightforward.  
However, governments do react to such tax planning strategies. German CFC rules 
treat the interest income of such conduit entities as passive income, and the German parent of 
the conduit entity may be subject to German taxation on the passive income abroad. For 
interest income of such foreign corporations the German statutory tax rate becomes effective 
unless the conduit entity can provide evidence that the forwarded loans have been exclusively 
financed on capital markets outside Germany (rather than by receiving equity from the 
German parent).  
To investigate whether the German regulations are binding, we identify all German-
owned subsidiaries for which lending to affiliated enterprises exceeds liabilities. For the rest 
of the paper we will label these corporations conduit entities with positive net lending 
(CEPNL). There are two reasons for concentrating on subsidiaries that are net lenders. First, 
given that interest rates on borrowing and lending are approximately the same, using liabilities 
to finance lending is not a tax-efficient strategy: in such cases interest payments received and 
interest payments paid should largely net out (assuming that arm’s-length transfer pricing 
rules are respected), and the resulting profit and thus possible tax savings are near zero. 
Second, German CFC rules will be applicable in cases where net lending is positive. 
Conversely, if net lending is negative, we may conclude that all the funds have been raised on 
foreign capital markets, which implies that German CFC rules were not applicable.  
Table 4 offers descriptive statistics on the number of German-owned conduit entities 
complying with a positive net lending and presents the respective amount of loans to affiliated   17
enterprises in 2005. The table includes all countries that in 2005 have hosted more than two 
CEPNLs. In total this yields 170 cases. The total amount of net lending for these 170 cases is 
moderate, at least for non-U.S. subsidiaries. In the Netherlands, for example, German-owned 
subsidiaries accounted for €879m. of net lending. Among the countries in Table 4, the only 
low-tax country according to the definition of the German CFC rules is Ireland. Tax-haven 
countries, such as the Cayman Islands or the Bermudas, are not used as significant locations 
for conduit entities in the sample presented here.
13 Tax incentives for setting up conduit 
entities may however apply in the cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland. In both countries, 
holding company regimes apply to certain corporations that may considerably reduce the 
effective tax rate on interest income (see Weichenrieder and Mintz 2008).  
 
                                                 
13 For confidentiality reasons we cannot report descriptive statistics if the number of observations per year in a 
country is lower than three. Hence all countries not represented in the table above may at maximum have two 
conduit entities with net lending in 2006.   18
Table 4: Conduit entities with positive net lending by country (2006) 
Country  Lending to affiliated companies 
less liabilities (in million euros) 
No. of conduit 
entities 
Statutory tax rate 
USA 53824  58  0.4 
UK 3574  38  0.3 
Switzerland 610  31  0.29 
France 563  30  0.3333 
Netherlands 807  26  0.296 
Belgium 2607  12  0.3399 
Austria 309  10  0.25 
South Africa  82  9  39.6 
Luxembourg 1109  8  0.2963 
Irland 718  7  0.125 
Spain 28  6  0.35 
Sweden 71  6  0.28 
Canada 405  5  0.361 
Italy 226  5  0.3725 
Cayman Islands  4406  4  0 
Singapore 32  4  0.2 
Australia 25  4  0.3 
Jersey 99  4  20 
Finland 31  3  0.26 
Denmark 51  3  0.28 
Estonia 21  3  0.23 
Malta 243  3  0.35 
Annotations: The table reports on those conduit entities for which net lending (lending to affiliated companies 
minus total liabilities) is positive. We left out firms with an ownership share of the German investor of less than 
90%, and excluded unincorporated subsidiaries and subsidiaries in banking and insurance, as these industries are 
treated differently under the German CFC rules. For confidentiality reasons, we do not report on countries with 
less than three qualifying subsidiaries.  
 
Table 5: The treatment of interest income from lending to affiliated companies   
(positive net lending) 
  Treatment of passive income 
subsidiaries 
derived from lending to 
 1993–2002  From  2003 
Treaty country with activity clause 
and nontreaty countries 
German parent is taxed on total 
interest income of the foreign 
subsidiary 
German parent is taxed on total 
interest income of the foreign 
subsidiary 
Treaty country without activity 
clause 
German parent is taxed on 60 
percent of the interest income of 
the foreign subsidiary 
German parent is taxed on total 
interest income of the foreign 
subsidiary 
 
The effects of the German CFC rules on the number of CEPNLs may be investigated 
by looking at the 2003 reform.
14 Table 5 explicates the effect of this reform, which had a 
                                                 
14 § 10 (6) Außensteuergesetz was abolished with effect from fiscal year 2003.   19
differential effect on conduit entities depending on tax treaty details. The reform implied no 
change for CEPNLs in cases where the tax treaty contains an activity clause. In pre- and 
postreform years, the German CFC rules triggered a tax for the German parent (at a rate of 
approximately 39% in 2005) if a foreign subsidiary derived interest income from 
intracompany loans, the loans were not financed on local capital markets, and a low foreign 
tax rate on the interest income applied. Conversely, if the relevant tax treaty contains no 
activity clause, then the prereform treatment of the parent implied that only 60 percent of the 
foreign interest income was subjected to German tax. For the postreform years, the preference 
given in these cases was lost, and 100 percent of the foreign interest income was subject to 
German tax. As a result, the reform decreased the incentives to use low-tax countries that 
enjoy the preference of a double-tax treaty with no activity clause, and from 2003 we should 
expect to see a diminishing number of conduit entities there. We should add that the reform 
has affected only a few countries, since Germany has accepted omission of an activity clause 
only in a limited number of cases, including France, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and 
Norway, with the most prominent low-tax jurisdiction being Ireland. Indeed, Ireland is the 
only host country that fell below the 25% safe-haven rate of the German CFC rules and is 
enjoying a tax treaty without activity clause.  
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for CEPNLs in Ireland. Overall, German 
multinationals did not make extensive use of those conduit entities in Ireland, and the 
maximum number of CEPNLs was nine, reached in 1997. The aggregated amount of loans to 
affiliated enterprises not financed by liabilities reached a maximum of €978m. in 1996. 
Assuming an interest rate of 5% and a German statutory tax rate of roughly 56% at that time, 
the tax savings from using the Ireland CEPNLs may have reached some €22.5m. [= €978m. × 
5% × (56% – 10%)] in this year.  
   20
Table 6: Conduit entities in Ireland 
Year  Lending to affiliated 
companies net of borrowing 
(in million euros) 
Number of conduit entities 
with positive net lending 
Corporate tax rate  
2006  718  7  12.5% 
2005 619 4  12.5% 
2004 *  *  12.5% 
2003 329 4  12.5% 
2002 423 7  10.0% 
2001 70  6  10.0% 
2000 229 5  10.0% 
1999 66  6  10.0% 
1998 777 7  10.0% 
1997 840 9  10.0% 
1996 978 7  10.0% 
Annotations: * Information on less than three observations has to be omitted for confidentiality reasons.  
 
The change in German CFC rules from 2003 onwards was associated with a reduction 
of the number of conduit entities in Ireland. Table 6 revisits the effect of the 2003 reform by 
presenting microeconometric evidence. The analysis is based on all subsidiaries of 421 
German parents that had at least one CEPNL according to our definition. Each of these 
subsidiaries is then treated as one observation. The left-hand variable of the regressions is a 
zero-one indicator, with a value of one if the German-owned subsidiary is a CEPNL, i.e., its 
lending to affiliated companies is larger than its liabilities. Besides the variables used before, 
we now also include two new ones. CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI, like CFC_DUMMY, can only 
be equal to one if the local statutory tax rate is below the German safe-haven rate. Unlike 
CFC_DUMMY, it is only equal to one if the subsidiary under consideration benefits from the 
absence of an activity clause in the relevant tax treaty. Since prior to 2003 these subsidiaries 
received preferential treatment in the German CFC rules, we should expect a positive 
coefficient, i.e., a higher likelihood of CEPNLs (given inclusion of the variable 
CFC_DUMMY). Since the preference for low-tax countries without activity clause was 
dropped for years from 2003, we expect that this positive effect is nullified for this period. To 
allow identification of this hypothesis we include the variable 
CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI*POST2003, which equals CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI for 2003 
through 2005, but is zero otherwise.    21
 
Table 7: Locating conduit entities with positive net lending 
 Panel  logit 
OLS, linear 
probability 
CT  −1.664  -0.0527 
 (1.38)  (0.055) 
CFC_DUMMY -0.659***  -0.0270*** 
 (0.25)  (0.0089) 
CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI 0.815**  0.0381*** 
 (0.38)  (0.014) 
CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI*POST2003 -1.066**  -0.0577*** 
 (0.52)  (0.021) 
LN(CORR) 1.002***  0.0433*** 
 (0.26)  (0.011) 
LN(GDP) -0.0239  -0.00336* 
 (0.056)  (0.0019) 
LN(GDPPC) 0.643***  0.00508 
 (0.22)  (0.0051) 
LN(INTEREST) -0.374*  -0.00847** 
 (0.21)  (0.0043) 
LN(ASSETS) 0.124***  0.00692*** 
 (0.047)  (0.0015) 
Observations 24951  25282 
Pseudo R-squared / R-squared  0.07  0.19 
 
Annotations: Dependent variable: dummy indicating positive net lending of the subsidiary. Stars denote p-
values: *** p < 0.01; ** p< 0.05; * p < 0.1. Conditional logit standard errors are robust and clustered on the 
parent level; results for the OLS are robust and corrected for clustering within country-year cells. All estimations 
include time fixed effects and parent fixed effects, and firms are observed during the period 1996–2006 
(unbalanced sample). The logit model drops groups with all positive or all negative outcomes; therefore 
observations differ between models. Banks and insurance firms are not included in the sample, since their 
activities are assumed to be active according to the German CFC rules.  
 
The regression results presented in Table 7 confirm that German CFC rules affect 
affiliate behavior. A binding German CFC rule (i.e., a local tax rate below the German safe-
haven rate) reduces the frequency of CEPNLs, as indicated by the significantly negative 
coefficient of CFC_DUMMY in the panel logit as well as in a linear probability model. With 
an average probability of 6.5 percent, both models suggest that binding CFC rules reduce the 
probability of a German parent owning a CEPNL in a country by some 45 percent.  
The coefficient for CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI indicates that – compared with low-tax 
countries that have an activity clause in their treaty with Germany – low-tax countries that do 
not face this clause host more CEPNLs. The negative coefficient of   22
CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI*POST2003 also shows that the elimination of the CFC preference 
roughly nullified this effect, with the combined effect of the two variables being 
insignificantly different from zero. The significance of the coefficients and the opposite signs 
of these two variables of interest are conserved across different regression specifications, at 
least at the ten percent level. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the coefficients 
for CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI*POST2003 and CFC_DUMMY*NOACTI, unlike those for 
CFC_DUMMY,  are based exclusively on firm observations in Ireland, and the results should 
therefore be taken with a grain of salt. The model also uses the additional covariates included 
in previous regressions. The positive coefficient of LN(ASSETS) indicates that CEPNLs tend 
to be above average size. The coefficients of LN(CORR) and LN(INTEREST) are plausibly 
indicating that conduit entities are attracted by low corruption and low interest rates.  
 
IV.3.  Exemption of Repatriated Passive Income: the 2001 Reform  
As mentioned above, the German double-tax treaties differ with respect to inclusion of 
an activity clause. The previous subsection has discussed this in connection with the 2003 
reform, which changed the tax treatment of intracompany lending conducted through 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries (i.e., countries below the safe haven rate). The differences in 
bilateral tax treaties are also relevant for high-tax partner countries, due to the 2001 German 
tax reform. Before 2001, exemption of dividends paid from treaty countries with activity 
clause was restricted to dividends from active income, while dividends paid from passive 
income were taxed by using the credit system. Since 2001, Germany has extended the 
exemption system unilaterally also to countries that have agreed to an activity clause in the tax 
treaty (and even to nontreaty countries). Hence, passive investment income repatriated from 
countries without an activity clause was exempt from German taxation before as well as after 
2001, whereas dividends repatriated from countries with an activity clause were tax-exempt in 
Germany only from 2001 onwards. This tax reform therefore gives us the opportunity to   23
investigate the changed incentives in activity-clause countries, using the subsidiaries in 
countries without a clause as a control group, allowing the use of interactive variables.  
As in Section IV.1, we start by using the log of passive investment (excluding loans 
and equity in affiliated companies) as the left-hand variable in a panel OLS model [columns 
(1)–(3)]. The treatment group in our natural experiment consists of all the subsidiaries in 
countries that either have no tax treaty with Germany or have one with an activity clause. For 
these subsidiaries the German 2001 reform made the tax treatment of passive income more 
lenient. To identify this effect we created the dummy variable POST_REFORM_W, which 
takes on the value one in years 2001–2006 if the relevant country has an activity clause or no 
tax treaty at all. Again, specification (1) starts with a relatively parsimonious empirical model. 
In line with our hypothesis, the coefficient of POST_REFORM_W is positive and significant, 
indicating that the reform has made passive investment relatively more attractive in countries 
that had agreed on an activity clause (or have no tax treaty). Compared to the control group, 
the reform has increased the amount of passive investments in arm's-length investments by 
more than 20 percent.  
The application of the credit method or the exemption method at the level of the 
German parent matters more, the lower the tax rate in the host country. Therefore, passive 
investments in low-tax countries should be more reactive to the tax policy change. To look 
into this we created yet another dummy by interacting POST_REFORM_W with LOW, a 
dummy for countries with a tax rate at or below 35 percent, yielding the variable 
POST_REFORM_W_LOW. Using this variable along with POST_REFORM_W in column 
(2) leads to a higher level for the coefficient of POST_REFORM_W_LOW than of 
POST_REFORM_W. Although the inclusion of this split reduces the significance, the size of 
the estimated coefficients indicates that the change in passive investments occurred mostly in 
countries with moderate tax rates. This is also suggested by column (3), which reports a 
significant estimate for POST_REFORM_W_LOW when POST_REFORM_W is dropped.  
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Table 8: German tax reform 2001 and passive investment  
 OLS   Panel  Poisson 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) 
CT  0.874 0.767 0.929    0.964 0.441  1.056 
 (0.62)  (0.60)  (0.62)    (1.70) (2.75)  (1.72) 
POST_REFORM_W  0.205** 0.0746      0.379*  −0.00539  
 (0.083)  (0.20)      (0.21) (0.31)   
POST_REFORM_W_LOW   0.156  0.206**     0.452  0.435* 
   (0.20)  (0.080)     (0.34)  (0.23) 
LOW   -0.105*       -0.177   
   (0.059)       (0.25)   
LN(CORR)  0.0909 0.104  0.0817    0.261 0.269  0.247 
 (0.098)  (0.099)  (0.100)    (0.28) (0.25)  (0.31) 
LN(GDP)  0.00502 -0.145  0.132   4,565 5,005  4,790 
 (1.83)  (1.81)  (1.81)    (6.12) (5.87)  (6.10) 
LN(GDPPC)  2.124 2.241 2.014    -3.493 -3.862  -3.671 
 (1.88)  (1.85)  (1.86)    (6.89) (6.12)  (6.16) 
LN(INTEREST)  0.155 0.157 0.144    0.0213 0.0355  0.0157 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)    (0.26) (0.21)  (0.19) 
LN(ASSETS)  0.203*** 0.204*** 0.203***    0.106** 0.105**  0.105** 
 (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)    (0.042) (0.044)  (0.044) 
Observations 21657 21657 21657 35185  35185  35185
R-squared 0.85  0.85  0.85   --  --  -- 
Annotations: Dependent variable is the log of passive assets in columns (1)–(3), and the absolute value of 
passive assets in (4)–(6). OLS columns report robust standard errors, corrected for clustering within country-year 
cells. Poisson standard errors are derived from bootstrapping. Stars denote p-values: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * 
p < 0.1. All estimations include firm and time fixed effects. Firms are observed during the period 1996–2005 
(unbalanced sample). Banks and insurance firms are not included in the sample.  
 
The same objections against application of OLS models that have been quoted in 
Section V.1 could be raised here. Therefore, we follow our previous approach and 
complement the OLS estimates with the respective panel Poisson models. Like the OLS 
models, the Poisson models (4)–(6) suggest that the countries that have benefited from the 
2001 extension of the exemption privilege have received additional passive assets compared 
to other countries. While the estimated coefficients are roughly twice as high as those in 
columns (1)–(3), they also come with a higher standard error for the tax variables.  
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
CFC rules, which are designed to curb the tax revenue losses due to the outflow of passive 
investments into low-tax countries, are part of the international tax systems of most developed   25
countries. So far there has been almost no empirical work on the effects of these rules. In this 
paper we have tried to fill this gap by looking at German experience. Overall, the German past 
experience suggests that CFC rules seem to enable even a high-tax country to significantly 
inhibit the migration of passive assets into low-tax jurisdictions. Based on a comprehensive 
database of German FDI, we found that offshore tax-haven countries – the Cayman Islands, 
Barbados, and the like – are not able to attract major amounts of passive investment or a large 
number of financing subsidiaries. Neither are these offshore jurisdictions particularly 
attractive for the location of conduit entities that are equity-funded and grant these funds to 
affiliated companies by granting loans.  
  Our empirical work for the first time provides microeconometric evidence on the 
working of the German CFC rules. One piece of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of 
the rules is that, while a lower local tax rate in general attracts German passive investment, 
this effect is lower for countries for which the rules are applicable, since their local rate is 
below the safe-haven rate. There is also some evidence that the German 2003 revision of the 
CFC rules, which ended a tax preference for conduit entities in some treaty countries, was 
successful in curbing passive investments in the form of intracompany loans. Finally, this 
paper looked at the 2001 tax reform, which unilaterally introduced the exemption of foreign 
dividends when received by a German corporation. While prior to the reform dividends from 
various treaty countries were exempt only in the case of an active business abroad, the reform 
introduced exemption even for dividends paid from passive investment income (provided the 
CFC rules are not applicable). We find evidence that this legislation has measurably increased 
the passive investment in the countries that profit from the reform. This may be interesting 
information for countries like the U.S. and Japan, which are currently discussing the move 
from a credit system of international taxation to an exemption system.    26
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